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Summary

In the period since March of this year Moscow has exerted increased efforts to reach the American radio audience and to undermine American public support for the Korean war. Broadcast time for American audiences has been doubled by an increase in broadcasting to North America from 33 to 50 hours weekly and by the addition of a daily two hour transmission for U.N. forces in the Far East. Transmitter facilities have been augmented in an effort to ensure better reception in the U.S.: additional frequencies have been allocated to the North American service, including those of four Satellite radios which now relay Moscow's North American programs. In April Prague, Warsaw, and Budapest started ~~stepping~~ these broadcasts, which had previously been carried only by stations within the USSR, and in May a new Sofia transmitter was added on a frequency which reaches the U.S. with particular effectiveness.

The new programs in English to the Far East, transmitted on frequencies usually used for broadcasts to Japan, Korea and Northeast China, are concerned only with the Korean war, a concentration which in itself constitutes a departure from Moscow's usual broadcasting patterns. The broadcasts are clearly intended to lower the morale of the United Nations forces; their highly repetitious contents are for the most part devoted to American opposition to the war, the profit-seeking motives of American industrialists, and the subservience of Washington to Wall Street.

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CLASSIFICATION

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Increase in Moscow Broadcasts to North America

	Weekly Total To All Foreign Audiences hrs. / mins.		Weekly Broadcasts to North America hrs./mins./% of Col. I		
April 1949	390	45	20	30	5.2
October 1949	456	15	22	15	4.8
April 1950	470	15	25	45	5.4
October 1950	548	20	32	40	5.9
April 1951	586	-	50	10	8.5
(including broadcasts to U.N. forces:			64	10	10.9)

As indicated in the preceding table, the sharpest increase to North America in the past two years occurred with the spring frequency changes in April of this year, when Moscow also added 14 hours weekly in English to the Far East to bring the total time devoted to American audiences to 64 hours 10 minutes weekly, 10.9 percent of its total effort to non-Soviet audiences. This exceeds the time on the air for German audiences (55 hours 45 minutes weekly) and that for all broadcasts in Yugoslav languages (54 hours 15 minutes) the two other audiences for whom Moscow demonstrates most concern.

During the spring months Moscow also took steps to improve the audibility of its North American broadcasts; it increased the number of frequencies used on this beam from seven to twelve, commandeering the services of Satellite transmitters to relay programs formerly relayed only from inside the Soviet Union. Although there is no indication of increased power in individual transmitters, the augmented relay facilities and the shift to summer frequencies account for a marked improvement in the signal strength of Soviet shortwave broadcasts in the United States. The addition of the new Sofia transmitter in June brought a particularly marked improvement, for its transmission frequency is better suited to prevailing seasonal conditions than those of the other relay stations.

Shift in Emphasis Pattern

With the change to summer frequencies, the addition of Satellite relay facilities, and the increase of transmission time Moscow shifted the emphasis pattern of its English-language broadcasts on the Korean war. First, it increased the percentage of Korean war propaganda broadcast to North America, so that in the past two months more than a third of all comment on the war has been biased to North America alone. (Discussions of the war in Korean and Mandarin broadcasts have declined and now constitute less than one tenth of Moscow's total attention to the war.)

Secondly, this increased concentration of comment on the war in broadcasts to North America is coupled with an increased concentration on the propaganda campaign to undermine the morale of the American audience. In the first three months of 1951 discussions of American opposition to the war amounted to one third of total English-language comment on the war; since April this ratio has increased to 53%. In the same period claims that American leaders and industrialists are pursuing the war out of their desire for profits, another standard element of the propaganda attack on the home front, have increased from 14% to 26% of English-language comment on the war.

The morale-lowering purposes of the broadcasts for U.N. forces in the Far East are indicated by their structure and content. The same half-hour program is broadcast four times during the evening, Korean time. Its commentaries follow the same emphasis patterns found in broadcasts to North America: American opposition to the war fills one half the content, and Wall Street's profiteering one fifth.

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